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For nearly two millennia, present-day Turkey has held political, cultural, and 
economic importance in world history. From the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires 
to the modern Turkish republic, Anatolia and Thrace have been straddling the 
Eastern and Western worlds and continue to have far-reaching importance in 
Eurasia today. While knowledge of Turkey’s historical heritage is essential for an 
understanding of its contemporary politics, this paper focuses on developments 
since the founding of the Republic in 1923. 
 This paper argues that Turkey has emerged as a regional power in Eurasia 
and that this emergence has implications for US-Turkish relations. Specifically, I 
argue that the United States must strengthen its partnership with Turkey for the 
benefit of American strategic interests in the region.  
 In part one, the paper examines factors that account for Turkey’s 
emergence as a regional power and how that power is manifest. In doing so, the 
purpose is to show that the factors presented in the literature are inadequate for 
fully explaining Turkey’s emergence. For example, Turkey’s introduction of neo-
liberal economic policies in the 1980s under Turgut Ozal or its European Union 
accession process starting in 1999 are often presented as developments that 
exclusively enabled Turkey’s emergence. However, this paper reveals that a 
multiplicity of developments, over several decades, worked to reinforce one 
another and resulted in Turkey’s emergence as a regional power. In chapter two, 
Turkey’s unique historical foundation is presented as a factor leading to its 
emergence. The nation-building project under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk which 
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focused on national unity, secularization, modernization, and westernization was 
fundamental to laying the foundation for the emergence.  
 Chapter three analyzes the evolution of democracy in Turkey to better 
elucidate contemporary internal dynamics. The process of democratization has in 
many ways defined Turkish politics and society and is necessary for appreciating 
Turkey as a Muslim majority democracy. Additionally, this chapter evaluates 
whether Turkey’s democracy is replicable and can serve as a standard-bearer for 
the nascent democracies of the Arab Spring. Chapter four examines economic and 
political policies over the last three decades, in particular the introduction of neo-
liberal economic policies and a more assertive regional foreign policy that 
induced internal modifications and enabled Turkey’s emergence. Chapter five 
analyzes the political and economic effects of Turkey’s interaction with the 
European Union, especially the EU accession process, which allowed Turkey to 
assume a larger regional role.  
 With an understanding of Turkey’s emergence as a regional power, part 
two analyzes the implications of Turkey’s new role for US-Turkish bilateral 
relations and for American interests in Eurasia. The broader purpose of this 
section is to show that Turkey is emblematic of a changing global political 
system, in which certain states are accruing larger regional significance mitigating 
the influence of larger powers like the United States. Chapter six gives an 
overview of the history of US-Turkish relations to put contemporary 
developments in historical context. This chapter also analyzes points of 
contention between the United States and Turkey. Finally, chapter seven 
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examines the changing power dynamics in Eurasia and their implications for 
American influence in the region. Also, this chapter argues for a strengthening of 
US-Turkey relations for mutually beneficial strategic interests.  
 The emergence of Turkey can be understood through the international 
relations theory of constructivism which is “characterized by an emphasis on the 
importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in 
shaping political action.”1 In essence, constructivist theorists like Christian Reus-
Smit argue that “how actors define their ‘selves’ . . . informs their ‘interests’” and 
actions.2 The notion that Turkey is an emergent power with enhanced influence in 
the region is a perception insisted upon by the Turkish leadership. By 
promulgating this self-conceived identity, Turkey is creating a space for itself in 
the region as a regional power. I argue that the amplified economic and political 
importance of Turkey justifies this self-conceived identity and that Turkey is an 
emergent regional power. Furthermore, I see a growing recognition outside of the 
region, specifically from the United States, of Turkey’s importance. Essentially, 
US policymakers are increasing cognizant of Turkey’s significance for American 
objectives in Eurasia, and I argue for strengthened bilateral relations to realize 
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 HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS: 





The nineteenth and twentieth centuries were eventful times for present-day 
Turkey. From the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the War of Independence to the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks were part of a pivotal point in history. 
The establishment of the Republic of Turkey was yet another monumental event. 
Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Turks successfully waged 
and won a war of independence and asserted their territorial integrity and national 
sovereignty. While initially a fragmented group of ethnic and religious 
communities, Ataturk succeeded in creating a cohesive nation-state that would 
eventually assert its regional power. This chapter examines the vision of Ataturk 
and the methods he used to establish a modern secular republic. The founding 
principles of the Republic enabled Turkey’s emergence as a regional power. 
 
THE IDEOLOGY OF ATATURK 
The legend of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is burned in the national consciousness of 
Turkey. Turks concur on his greatness and the notion that he alone deserves credit 
for the creation and resilience of the modern Turkish republic. In the mystique 
surrounding Ataturk, it is instructive to look at the guiding principles that 
motivated his vision of a new Turkey. Also, it is equally important to highlight the 
methods through which he facilitated the creation of the modern republic.  
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The state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire during Ataturk’s formative 
years shaped much of his ideology. As the “Sick Man of Europe” during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire spiraled 
uncontrollably to dissolution.3 Internal and external forces facilitated and 
precipitated this free-fall. Externally, world powers like Great Britain and France 
exerted economic and political pressure on a weak and ineffective state to 
apportion a part of the Empire after its predicted collapse. Internally, the 
multitude of ethnic groups in the Empire began to resent centralized rule from 
Istanbul and agitated for national sovereignty. As a result, Ataturk formulated an 
ideology based on the desire to keep foreign powers out of Turkish domestic 
affairs, and to create an undeniable Turkish national identity to unite disparate 
people groups.  
Furthermore, Ataturk’s view towards the social and religious culture 
prevalent in much of the Ottoman Empire shaped his ideology. He sought to turn 
away from the Middle Eastern, Islamic, and Ottoman heritage, and embrace a 
European identity.4 Ataturk believed that “national progress would come by 
emulating, absorbing and reproducing ‘European’ cultural values and political 
institutions.”5 He greatly disliked the diffusion of Islam in political and social life 
and was infatuated with all things European, both of which were evident in the 
policies and programs he enforced. While Ataturk was not personally religious, he 
saw the prominence of Islam as a sign of backwardness and a hindrance to the 
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establishment of a modern secular state. Nevertheless, he recognized religion as a 
“social force” useful as a tool if necessary to mobilize the polity but was quick to 
discard it when it obstructed his plans of modernization.6 Ataturk’s clearest 
position on religion came during his last address to the Turkish Parliament in 
which he stated, “We take our inspiration from life, and not from books believed 
to have come down from heaven.”7 This unambiguous reference to the Quran 
reveals Ataturk’s secularist ideology. His desire for Turkish progress led to 
decades of modernization through westernization.  
 
THE CREATION OF A NATION 
The establishment of the modern Turkish republic was a formidable task. 
Ataturk’s legacy lives because he faced and overcame a Herculean challenge. 
After the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the War of Independence, the Turkish 
people, landscape, infrastructure, and economy were decimated. Ataturk had to 
unite illiterate peasants and refugees into a nation strong enough to repel the 
“imposition of empires and nation-states with far greater resources and more 
knowledge about modernity.”8 In essence, Ataturk had the task of 
institutionalizing new social and political norms that enabled the establishment of 
a resilient state.  
 In this context, Ataturk conducted his mission of progress through 
secularization and modernization in undemocratic ways. Through a one-party 
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system, the Republic People’s Party (CHP), Ataturk enacted programs and 
policies intended to change the society drastically and consolidate the nation. 
While Ataturk used authoritarian methods to reach his objectives, he believed that 
“unless a modern, secular, and national culture [was] established, a modern 
political system, potentially hosting some form of democracy could not survive.”9 
The Tanzimat Reforms of the mid-nineteenth century had sought to modernize 
quickly in order to keep pace with rising European powers. One element of the 
Tanzimat Reforms was an attempt to limit the authority of the religious 
establishment in Ottoman legal procedures.10 Given Ataturk’s aversion to religion 
in the public sphere, his policies went further to marginalize the religious 
establishment. First, he attacked the traditional strongholds of institutionalized 
Islam including abolishing the Caliphate in 1924, secularizing family law in 1926, 
removing a constitutional clause making Islam the state religion of Turkey, and 
removing religious education from traditional bodies.11 In effect, Ataturk sought 
to limit the presence of religion from the public sphere to the private lives of 
citizens. Second, religious symbols were replaced with symbols of European 
civilization including a ban on the turban and fez in favor of western style hats.12 
Third, he sought to secularize social life, essentially an attack on popular Islam, 
including the adoption of western clock and calendar, the Latin alphabet, and 
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greater political rights for women consisting of suffrage and the right to stand for 
elections.13  
 As Erika Wilkens-Sozen notes, in the midst of these reforms came an 
effort to create a Turkish “national history” to build a cohesive national identity.14 
In 1927, Ataturk gave a thirty-six hour speech over the course of six days in 
which he retold the nation’s history from 1919 until 1927 in order to fit the 
narrative of an Independence struggle and the endeavor to create a new 
Republic.15 Part of this narrative emphasized a Turkish and Anatolian heritage as 
separate from the Middle Eastern and Islamic civilization of the Ottoman 
Empire.16  
 These aggressive reforms were not enacted without opposition. The new 
Republic’s biggest challenge came from ethnic and religious communities that 
still desired the reestablishment of an Ottoman system.17 The rebellion of Sheik 
Said, an influential Kurdish religious leader, exemplified this opposition. After 
the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, Sheik Said led a rebellion motivated by a 
desire for an autonomous or independent Kurdistan and also a Muslim uprising 
against the secular ruling party.18 The government in Ankara reacted swiftly and 
forcefully by sending an army to quell rebel forces, executing many leaders, 
resettling 20,000 Kurds from southeastern to western Turkey, and denying the 
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existence of a ‘Kurdish identity’.19 Additionally, the government passed the Law 
on the Maintenance of Order, which outlawed any institution or organization that 
might cause disturbance to law and order.20 As was true with the Sheik Said 
rebellion, the armed forces were, and are still, utilized for promulgating the 
government’s secularist agenda. During the Ottoman period, the armed forces 
were the first group to be modernized along western lines and have functioned as 
natural defenders of modernization and secularization in the name of progress.21  
 
CONCLUSION 
Though the early years of the Republic were volatile and combative, the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was vital to the consolidation of political 
authority and national unity. Through extensive secularization of politics, society 
and the legal system, Ataturk enabled the creation of the modern democratic 
Turkish state. However, while Ataturk highlighted the desire to be modern like 
the West, he used one-party autocratic rule to administer his programs and 
policies. He also disallowed opposition parties, used the state’s coercive power to 
purge opposition leaders, and even executed citizens who violated laws 
concerning the turban and fez.22 Evidently, Ataturk was a leader more committed 
to modernization than to liberal democracy.23 However, Ataturk remained 
cognizant of the disparities between his rhetoric and his actions, and justified 
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them by emphasizing the need for Turkey to reform drastically.24 In many ways, 
Ataturk established the institutions of democracy but left them dormant during his 
rule.25 In the 1930s he allowed some opposition parties to form and be active in 
order to foster public discourse. Most importantly, Ataturk’s insistence on 
secularization enabled the eventual development of a resilient democracy in a 
Muslim-majority state, a feat yet to be emulated. Ataturk’s lasting legacy can best 
be described in his own words: “I have established the republic. But today it is not 
clear whether the form of government is a republic, a dictatorship, or personal 
rule. I am mortal. I want the nation to get used to freedom before I die.”26 In 
promoting new norms of secularization and modernization, Ataturk never lost 
sight of the need for freedom in order for a society to progress. The political, 
economic, and social strength of Turkey today can be attributed to the vision and 
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THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN TURKEY: 





To understand the internal dynamics of Turkish politics and the nation’s broader 
regional importance, requires knowledge of the historical challenges of 
democratic consolidation in Turkey. From the inception of the Republic until 
today, Turkey underwent periods of one-party, authoritarian, military, and semi-
democratic rule. While sometimes overlapping and duplicating periods, each was 
formative in the development of Turkish democratic governance. Important 
features through all of these periods have been the Kemalist desire to secularize in 
pursuit of westernization and the active role of the military in civilian affairs. 
Anne Secor argues that the current ruling party, the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), has reconfigured the fault lines of democracy in Turkey and 
prompted the question of whether Islamist rulers can govern in a secular 
democratic framework.27 This question takes on greater meaning with the process 
of democratization sweeping the Arab world today. To examine the notion that 
Turkey can serve as a model Muslim democracy, this chapter analyzes the 
composition of Turkish democracy and speculates as to whether it is replicable. 
Turkey’s ability to incorporate moderate Islamist parties into a semi-democratic 
system has legitimized Turkey in western eyes and given greater credence to its 
position as a regional power.  
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THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN TURKEY 
In addition to free and fair elections, principles associated with democracy are 
freedom of speech, equal protection of minorities, and limiting the “tutelary”28 
rights of the unelected. Throughout the republican period, Turkey has been 
challenged on all of these fronts in its effort to consolidate democracy. 
Authoritarianism began under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP). From the creation of the nation in 1923 until the first free 
and fair multi-party elections in 1950, the CHP used its unrestrained mandate to 
secularize and to westernize the young republic. Underlying its efforts was the 
notion that “removal of Islam from political discourse was fundamental to the 
making of the modern nation-state.”29 The tensions between religion and politics 
that plagued the Ottoman Empire dominated the early years of the republic. Anne 
Secor characterizes the Kemalist project as an aggressive approach towards 
religion, termed laicism, which was not simply “freedom of or from religion” but 
instead government control of religion.30 The goal of subverting religion under 
government control was to moderate the pervasive influence it could potentially 
wield in the public sphere. As a result, article 136 of the Turkish constitution 
established the Directorate of Religious Affairs, tasked with “administration of 
mosques and the training of religious personnel.”31 In addition to the Directorate, 
the Turkish state would utilize the military and constitutional courts as institutions 
of secularization.  
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 While founded on the undemocratic single-party governance of the CHP, 
Turkey would eventually make its first transition to electoral democracy in 1950, 
with the Democratic Party (DP) taking the mantle of government. From 1950 to 
1983, Turkey’s efforts at democratization were thwarted by political instability, 
civil unrest, and military intervention. In 1960, 1971, and 1980, the military 
intervened to displace elected governments, fulfilling its role as a secularist 
modernizing institution with the task of maintaining political and social order. As 
a dominant presence in civilian affairs, the military has an interesting, albeit 
undemocratic role, as stipulated in the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service 
Law which gives it “wide room for maneuver to intervene into politics” and has 
“budgetary autonomy which is not entirely under the control of elected 
civilians.”32 Lauren McLaren argues that the paradoxical function of the military 
as the defender of secularism while undermining elected governments poses one 
of the greatest challenges to Turkish democratization.33 Similarly, from 1971 to 
2001 the constitutional courts banned political parties deemed to be violating the 
nation’s secularist principles. Most recently, on February 28, 1997, the courts and 
military collaborated to remove the Refah (Welfare) Party after elections that put 
it in control of a coalition government.34 The now infamous “February 28th 
process” illustrated the authority held by the military and courts, which McLaren 
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considers “the high-water mark of secularist backlash against the Islamicization of 
the Turkish public sphere.”35  
 Since the military intervention of 1980 and the subsequent rewriting of the 
nation’s constitution, there has been greater progress towards Turkish 
democratization. However, democracy has yet to be consolidated in Turkey. The 
“tutelary”36 powers historically granted to the military are not entirely repudiated 
by the majority of the population. Many Turks still consider the military and 
courts as protectors of the Kemalist secularist project. In effect, while the military 
was vital for stabilizing the government during its interventions, “elites and 
masses alike can envision alternatives to democratic rule and these are not 
perceived as terrible enough to force them into democratic compromises.”37 To 
become a “fully functioning democracy”,38 Turkey needs to agree on how the 
regime will function. In essence, issues such as the role of religion, rights of 
religious groups, and the treatment of ethnic minorities need to be resolved so 
there are established “rules of the regime” to enable democratic consolidation.39 
 
DEMOCRACY UNDER THE AKP 
Since taking power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has 
changed the nation’s political landscape and reconfigured the essence of 
democracy in Turkey. The meteoric rise and sustained success of the AKP has 
been of special interest to observers of Eurasian politics. Under its dominant 
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leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the AKP has solidified its hold on 
domestic politics and has overseen the economic and political emergence of a 
regionally influential Turkey. Ideologically, AKP members self-identify as 
conservatives or Muslim-democrats. While recognizing the importance of Islam 
for the party, the AKP is careful to distance itself from characterizations of party 
members as Islamists who want to undermine the secularism of the state with 
Islamic principles. Criticism of the AKP’s ideology rests on the notion that the 
party is “bent on the Islamization of Turkish society and the Turkish state.”40 The 
secularist establishment fears that the AKP is hiding its Islamic agenda in order 
not to be condemned by the constitutional courts, a practice referred to as 
“takiyye.”41  
 The bourgeoning popularity of the AKP can be attributed not only to its 
ideological leanings, but also to its success in producing economic results and 
effective public administration. The AKP initially gained its national reputation as 
the party of results, with effective management of municipal public services 
nation-wide. Economically, the AKP “carried out a successful privatization 
program and encouraged foreign investment, which has risen twentyfold” since 
2002.42 These successes in addition to the AKP’s ideology have resulted in a 
constituency of supporters able to continue reelecting the AKP. According to 
Ihsan Dagi, this broad-based constituency includes the pro-market devout 
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bourgeoisie, the urban and rural poor, and the unemployed, a plurality of the 
electorate that sustain the AKP’s electoral success.43   
 Since coming to power, the AKP faced the difficult challenge of balancing 
EU accession reforms aimed at further democratizing Turkey with a hostile 
secular establishment that includes the influential military. The AKP’s objective 
has been to establish “new rules of the game and a more democratic definition of 
the civil-military equation in Turkey, where a politically autonomous and secular 
military is pitted against a popularly elected Islamic government in the context of 
an electoral democracy.”44 To this end, the AKP has made many changes, 
including reducing the role of the military in civilian affairs, “liberalizing laws 
regarding Kurdish language broadcasting and use, and generally bringing Turkey 
further in line with Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU.”45 One major 
effort towards democratization was a September 2010 referendum with 26 
constitutional amendments partially aimed at changing the structure of 
administrative courts and lessening the role of the military. The passage of the 
referendum served to vindicate the AKP and showed popular support for the 
party’s modernizing efforts, regardless of staunch opposition from the secular 
establishment. 
 Such progressive moves by the AKP have been undermined by other 
instances of undemocratic practices. Most notably, the 2007 Ergenekon affair was 
an example of the AKP displaying authoritarian tendencies. The affair involved 
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an investigation of a supposed coup conspiracy involving the Turkish ‘deep state’ 
composed of “networks between military, intelligence agents, organized crime, 
right-wing paramilitaries, leftist intellectuals, the PKK, and seemingly all manner 
of anti-AKP elements.”46 The investigation resulted in draconian measures by the 
AKP to combat the supposed threat in which “nearly 200 journalists, scholars, 
military personnel, business leaders, and politicians have been 
arrested.”47Western governments viewed the heavy-handed response negatively as 
a blatant suppression of free speech. Even more, the “crackdown has been 
perceived as a pretext to purge ideological opponents across the political spectrum 
and thereby to consolidate AKP hegemony.”48  
 Under the AKP, democratization in Turkey continues to be problematic. 
While the party has shown potential, especially with EU-induced reforms aimed 
at greater democracy, the Ergenekon investigations and prosecutions are an 
alarming indicator of centralized and undemocratic AKP control. Though the 
AKP maintains its dedication to progressive reforms, critics claim that “its 
commitment to diversity and freedom of expression is very narrowly wrought and 
seems not to move much beyond a commitment to the freedom of Islamic 
expression within the secular state.”49 In essence, the AKP appears to be more 
focused on expanding the visibility of Islam in the public sphere rather than on 
genuine efforts at democratization. The prospects for consolidated democracy in 
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Turkey under the AKP will depend on the ability of EU reforms to institute 
democratic institutions and practices.  
 
TURKEY AS A MODEL MUSLIM DEMOCRACY? 
In the past year a wave of democratization has swept the Arab world. This “Arab 
Spring” has substantially improved prospects for real democracy in the region. 
The fall of authoritarian regimes brought elections in Tunisia and Egypt, and 
forthcoming elections in Libya. In just one year, the region has gone from a 
bastion of electoral authoritarianism to a region largely unfriendly to despotic 
rule. Given these developments, Turkey has frequently been considered as a 
possible model for these infant democracies, as Turkey is the only Muslim-
majority nation with experience as a democratic nation, however flawed.  
 A major difficulty in using Turkey as a model is the dissimilarity of the 
historical development of democracy in Turkey vis-à-vis the Arab Spring nations. 
The contemporary political order in Turkey is the result of a “long process of 
staggered progress towards democratization”50 which is still developing. After 
decades of democratizing, some aspects of Turkish politics have stalled 
democracy. Factors such as the government’s inability to accommodate organized 
labor, limitations on speech, and continued discrimination against ethnic and 
religious minorities are all blights on Turkey’s democratic record.51 
In democratizing nations like Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, their recent 
political experience has been characterized by electoral authoritarianism in which 
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the ruling regime maintained authoritarian institutions and practices while 
instituting some semblance of democracy via elections.52 In essence, these states 
are devoid of many of the social and political infrastructures necessary for the 
establishment of a lasting democracy. Also, the role of Islam in political discourse 
will be important for the viability of democracy in the Arab world. It will be 
interesting to see the extent to which secularist principles are adhered to that 
enable freedom for and from religion. Therefore, using Turkey as a model raises 
the question of whether it has “successfully incorporated political Islam into a 
secular state structure, and can therefore be a model of secular democracy for 
Muslim-majority states?”53 While lessons can be drawn from the evolution of 
democratization in Turkey, applying that model to the very different conditions in 
the Arab world would yield unpredictable outcomes.54 In its process of 
democratization, Turkey has attempted to create a state that resembles the western 
notion of democracy. The Arab Spring nations do not share this western identity 
and may desire a form of democracy unlike the Turkish model. While Turkey can 
be instructive in some respects, it should not be considered a standard-bearer for 
the democratizing Arab Spring nations.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Democratization in Turkey has been a long and protracted process which is 
continuously evolving. Understanding Turkey’s troubled democratic pedigree is 
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essential for a more nuanced appreciation of its contemporary political condition. 
While democracy has improved, concerns remain about the extent to which the 
military influences civilian affairs and government policies on personal liberty 
and minority rights. Even with its numerous problems, Turkey can be instructive 
for the emerging democracies across the Arab world in showing one way to 
incorporate moderate Islam into a democratic political system. Nevertheless, 
Turkey’s unique historical development makes it unfit as a replicable model for 






































Over the last three decades, Turkey has applied economic and political policies to 
enable its emergence as a regional power. Economically, the transition from 
import-substitution to neo-liberalism illustrated Turkey’s desire to modernize and 
integrate into the global economy. While there have been some structural 
difficulties, Turkey’s economic liberalization ultimately resulted in a stronger 
domestic market and greater trade cooperation with regional neighbors. 
Politically, the post-Cold War era has witnessed the materialization of a more 
assertive Turkish foreign policy and greater recognition by the international 
community that Turkey is a formidable player in Eurasian affairs. These 
occurrences were enabled by Turkey’s inclusion in the ‘West’ during the bi-polar 
Cold War era and of that legitimization resulting in its pivotal regional role. These 
economic and political developments encountered considerable challenges, but 
have undoubtedly been a large part of Turkey’s emergence as a regional power.  
 
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN TURKEY 
The state of Turkey’s economy over the last three decades can be characterized as 
sporadic, with periods of growth and success, a subsequent period of painful 
structural failing, and, most recently, with reserved optimism for the future. 
According to Ziya Onis, this changeability takes root in Turkey’s transition from 
an import-substitution to a neo-liberal economic model beginning in the early 
22 
 
1980s.55 Prior to this changeover, Turkey’s economy was defined by its efforts to 
protect and strengthen domestic industries through high tariffs and a generally 
favorable economic climate. Through protection of infant industries, Turkey 
desired to develop a market that would be competitive on the global stage. 
However, as Onis argues, Turkey’s shift to a neo-liberal model was not “from 
voluntary choice but as an inevitable and forced outcome of a major balance of 
payments crisis associated with the exhaustion of the import-substitution model of 
industrialization.”56 The end of this model was also due to the realization that 
Turkey would remain a peripheral nation in the global economic market, which 
was antithetical to the ambitious desires of political leaders.  
 Onis credits the liberalization of Turkey’s economy to the leadership of 
Turgut Ozal.57 After Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ozal is widely considered the most 
influential political leader in the history of the modern republic. Similar to 
Ataturk, Ozal had a dogged determination to make transformative changes to 
Turkey, sometimes using undemocratic methods with certain negative results but 
ultimately for the betterment of Turkey. As Prime Minister from 1983 until 1989 
and President from 1989 until 1993, Ozal provided a consistency in leadership 
that facilitated the realization of his objectives.58 Also, his unique and diverse 
experiences before political life helped in the formulation of his neo-liberal 
ideology and his ability to institute reform. Ozal’s service in the public sector with 
the Agency for Study of Electrical Energy and as Under-Secretary of the State 
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Planning Organization, the private sector with the Sabanci Corporation, and with 
the World Bank, equipped him with the necessary knowledge, connections, and 
capabilities to effectively liberalize the Turkish economy.59  
 Ozal’s neo-liberal policies aimed at opening Turkey’s economy to global 
forces with the goals of strengthening domestic industries and allowing the inflow 
of foreign investment. This liberalizing effort was encouraged and enabled by the 
“IMF and World Bank as the providers of massive financial support…due to 
Turkey’s geo-strategic importance.”60 Additionally, Turkey’s Customs Union 
with the European Economic Community became a “crucial element in the full-
scale liberalization” of the economy in the 1990s.61 In his role as a reformist 
politician, Ozal was charismatic and created a “mood of optimism whereby 
Turkish businessmen felt confident in their ability to penetrate distant markets.”62 
A minor indicator of Ozal’s success was that compared to the 1990s, average 
growth was higher and average inflation was lower through the course of the 
1980s.63 
 However, through his leadership, Ozal showed ambivalence to democratic 
economic institutions and undermined what he saw as inefficient bureaucracies. 
The institutionalization of Ozal’s “reform process in Turkey was associated with a 
weakening of the bureaucratic apparatus with costly consequences.”64 With the 
objective of swift and unimpeded reform, it would have been difficult for Ozal to 
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reach those goals within the existing economic structure.65 For example, after 
1986, “key decisions on privatization of state economic enterprises” were 
established top-down instead of utilizing the existing economic structure.66 The 
lack of a developed economic structure for facilitating neo-liberal policies would 
result in disastrous effects, evidenced by the economic crises that occurred in 
1994, 2000 and 2001.67 Nevertheless, during and after those crises Turkey sought 
to establish “strong regulatory institutions needed for effective implementation of 
neo-liberal programs in areas like privatization and banking sector reform.”68  
Since 1999, “IMF and EU discipline have helped Turkey institutionalize 
reforms and have greater fiscal discipline.”69 Subsequent reforms, especially 
under the AKP administration, enabled the emergence of Turkey as a regional and 
global economic power with great potential. In essence, the legacy of Ozal’s 
reforms realized that his “vision and influence was important in helping to 
transform a self-enclosed society, with a mediocre image of itself, to an outward 
and forward looking society that aimed to participate and play an active role in the 
key regions surrounding Turkey.”70 Parallel to this economic bourgeoning would 
be more aggressive political policies which collectively serve to illustrate 
Turkey’s regional ascendancy. 
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THE EMERGENCE OF TURKEY’S POLITICAL POWER 
Since the creation of the modern republic in 1923, Turkey has had geopolitical 
importance because it is situated at the heart of Eurasia. Strategist Zbigniew 
Brzezinski characterized Eurasia as a “grand chessboard”, equating control of the 
region to global preeminence and Turkey has realized its potential for becoming a 
pivotal player in regional affairs.71The foundations of this political emergence 
have been laid since the Cold War era. As part of the western camp in the bi-polar 
Cold War international political system, Turkey gradually gained political 
legitimacy with its allies in Europe and with the United States. Also, as a vital 
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952, Turkey 
has resoundingly proven its geo-political importance, potentially as the key to the 
grand chessboard’.  
 The post-Cold War era has witnessed drastic realignments in the 
international political system, resulting in a unipolar world of United States 
hegemony. While no longer under the American Cold War umbrella, Turkey has 
undertaken more independent policies in the region, asserting its political strength 
while maintaining its relations with Cold War allies. Beginning in the 1990s, 
Turkey sought rapprochement, in the form of stronger political and economic ties, 
with Middle East states, Russia, former Soviet states and Greece. For example, 
when Bashir al-Assad came to power in Syria in the early 2000s, there was a “free 
trade agreement further integrating the economies of avid adversaries of the 
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1990s.”72 Similarly, there was a “substantial increase in economic 
interdependence” between Turkey and its neighbor Georgia, involving the usage 
of the “Batum airport” and “Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project.”73  
 More recently, the current ruling government under the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) has pursued foreign policy objectives that are 
sometimes counter to the policies of the ‘West’, especially the United States. 
Most notably, in dealing with Israel, Iran, and the Iraq War, Turkey has 
undertaken policies to emphasize its “self-confidence” and desire to “carve out an 
independent sphere of influence.”74 Despite disapproval of American policy-
makers, Turkey has deepened its ties with Iran, a neighbor with whom it shares a 
310-mile border.75 Even more disturbing for the United States, was Turkey’s 
disapproval of American troops using Turkish territory in the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq.76 Furthermore, Turkey has drastically altered its relations with former 
regional partner Israel, as it has “veered from its strong economic and military ties 
with the Jewish state to firmly backing Palestinian independence.”77 This shift in 
AKP policy cannot be underestimated, as Turkey has historically been a major 
partner for Israel in a hostile region. These policy changes are indicative of a 
transformation in Turkey’s self-identity. As the AKP government embraces 
Turkey’s Islamic identity, there are changing perceptions of interests which has a 
resultant effect on actions. Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran and increasing 
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support for the Palestinian cause signify an evolution in its self- identity resulting 
in closer alignment with its Muslim neighbors.    
 According to Saul Cohen, the AKP’s foreign policy emphasizes regional 
cooperation and “zero problems”78 with its neighbors. Through effective use of 
soft power, Turkey seeks a role as a “benign regional power” with the 
responsibility of mediating regional conflicts.79 For example, Turkey hosted 
diplomatic meetings between Pakistani and Afghan Presidents Musharraf and 
Karzai in 2007 as well as between Israeli and Palestinian leaders Peres and Abbas 
in 2008.80 Outside of the region, there is growing recognition of Turkey’s 
burgeoning influence, epitomized by the United Nations request that Turkey take 
a leadership role in the Alliance of Civilizations Initiative.81 The Initiative is 
intended to “overcome prejudice, misconceptions, misperceptions, and 
polarization which potentially threaten world peace”82 and Turkey’s inclusion in 
the leadership of the Initiative is significant in showing the growing global 
perception of Turkey as an influential state.  
 Turkey’s relationship with the Arab League is indicative of its growing 
political influence. While not an Arab country, Turkey has benefited from its 
participation “in almost every crucial summit held by the 22-country 
organization.”83 Over the last several decades, “with the absence of an Arab 
‘national heroic figure’ such as Egypt’s former President, Gamal Abdel Nasser,” 
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the Arab world has suffered a power vacuum which is being filled by the 
charismatic Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.84 Recently, Turkey 
worked with the Arab League to resolve the crisis in Syria and took an aggressive 
stance aimed at removing President Bashar al-Assad from power.85 That effort is 
emblematic of Turkey’s determination to engage with its neighbors which Inan 
Ozyildiz asserts is a transition “toward a new coordinated regional system based 
on a combination of political and moral factors.”86 This engagement has been 
reciprocated as Turkey is enthusiastically accepted by members of the Arab 
League. Mohamad Chatah argues that there is growing recognition that Turkey 
can play a role in “encouraging reforms, and building stability and peace in the 
region.”87 There are great prospects for Turkey to continue utilizing its enhanced 
regional influence. Bahgat Korany boldly predicts that by 2050, Turkey will 
“have a first-class army, be more powerful than Germany, and rank as the world’s 
ninth most powerful state.”88 While this prediction is hyperbolic, it effectively 




The convergence of Turkey’s economic liberalization and political assertiveness 
has enabled the emergence of Turkey as a regional power. While these economic 
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and political explanations do not wholly explain why Turkey is now a pivotal 
actor in Eurasia, they are a substantial part of a layered progression that has led to 












































THE TRANFORMATIVE EFFECTS OF TURKEY’S INTERACTION 





Turkey’s interaction with the European Union (EU) has transformed its internal 
development and enabled its emergence as a regional power. This phenomenon is 
exemplified by Turkey’s ever-tightening relations with the European Union, 
especially with the accession process that has been underway over the last decade. 
The accession process precipitated political reforms, most notably efforts at 
further democratization involving lessening the role of the military in civilian 
affairs and enhancements of minority rights. According to Dimitar Bechev, these 
reforms increased Turkey’s legitimacy, shown it as a model nation, and bolstered 
its role as a leading regional player.89 Additionally, interaction with the European 
Union has resulted in internal economic developments allowing greater foreign 
penetration and the improvement of Turkey’s economic standing.  
 
THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL REFORMS 
Throughout Turkey’s Republican history, a recurring theme is the need to 
westernize in pursuit of national progress. This westernization has frequently 
involved turning towards Europe and pursing political and economic engagement. 
Turkey’s desire for membership in the European Union is emblematic of this 
national objective. Since the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate member in 
1999, Turkey has undergone extensive changes in order to realize the goal of EU 
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membership. Central to the modifications within Turkey has been the objective of 
fulfilling the EU Copenhagen criteria which emphasize the establishment of 
democratic institutions and a capable market economy.90 Also, accession 
negotiations since 2005 required further reforms to prepare Turkey for EU 
admission.91 Turkey’s eagerness for inclusion in the European Union was 
evidenced by a rush of nine harmonization packages adopted between 2002 and 
2004.92 These efforts at further democratization involved provisions for greater 
free speech and association, new criminal and civil codes, eradication of the death 
penalty, and “legal changes to facilitate the prosecution of public officials 
responsible for torture and maltreatment of prisoners.”93 Turkey’s commitment to 
Europeanization was shown in its readiness to modify quickly and the extent to 
which reforms fundamentally changed the fabric of the nation. Additionally, the 
reforms were undertaken by a multiplicity of political parties and disparate 
segments of society, making it a true “national project.”94  
 At the behest of the European Union, these reforms addressed the balance 
of civilian-military relations. As an institution designed to maintain the secular 
purity of the Turkish state, the armed forces have historically asserted a 
disproportionate control over civilian affairs. This influence was epitomized in the 
National Security Council (NSC), a body involving the General Staff, members of 
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the armed forces and cabinet ministers, whose recommendations were given 
priority by the cabinet, even though it was established after the 1960 coup to 
function as an advisory committee.95 With the amendment of Article 118 of the 
constitution in 2001, there was an increase in the number of civilian members of 
the NSC and restrictions which limited it to only advising the cabinet.96 While 
there is still some debate as to whether the influence of the armed forces has truly 
been restrained, the effort to make institutional changes to increase 
democratization with an eye toward EU inclusion is greatly significant.  
 Additionally, the Kurdish Question continues to be a stumbling block to 
Turkey’s acceptance in the European Union. A Kurdish minority seeks to protect 
its national identity, while the government narrative has portrayed the issue as a 
problem of economic underdevelopment in the region primarily inhabited by the 
Kurds and of insurgent violence by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). In the 
European Union, the Kurdish Question is perceived as a blight on the minority 
and human rights record of Turkey. However, Turkey faces the challenge of 
combating security threats posed by the PKK on its southeastern border while 
allowing the existence of a vibrant Kurdish identity along with a Turkish identity. 
To this end, beginning in 2009 the Turkish government undertook a campaign to 
liberalize laws concerning Kurds, allowing use of the Kurdish language and 
curtailing the government-sponsored village guard system, a program which used 
local Kurdish militia to crack down on unfavorable activity in the southeastern 
                                                          
95
 Gursoy, Yaprak. “The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms on the Political Autonomy of the Turkish 
Military.” South European Society and Politics 16.2 (2011): 293-308. Print. 
96
 Gursoy, 295. 
33 
 
territories.97 Furthermore, with the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 
1999 and a supposed lessening of rebellious PKK activity, the Turkish 
government was in a better position to extend greater liberties to the Kurdish 
population. Supporting this initiative was Ocalan’s repudiation of violence and 
“his advocacy of greater democracy and pluralism as a panacea to the Kurdish 
problem” which “coincided with the new government’s aim to develop a more 
liberal democracy and improve Turkey’s human rights record.”98  
 While democratizing in pursuit of EU admission, Kemal Kirisci has 
characterized Turkey’s recent foreign policy as “proactive engagement in the 
neighboring region.”99 With an ideology that emphasizes friendly relations with 
all neighbors, the current ruling party has improved relations with nations 
spanning from Iran and Russia to Egypt and Jordan. For example, Turkey’s 
willingness to sign a free trade agreement with Syria in 2004, a country it “almost 
went to war with in the 1990s,” reflects reoriented foreign policy objectives.100 
Using Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s “strategic depth” approach, Turkey seeks to 
claim “a place in the new pecking order of emergent powers.”101 Assisting this 
objective has been the increased democratization in Turkey that has come as a 
result of greater Europeanization. Turkey has seemingly become more appealing 
for regional nations and Saul Cohen argues that “most American foreign policy 
analysts view Turkey as . . . a forward point for NATO and the West to the 
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Middle East, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia.”102 In essence, Turkey’s 
unique hybrid identity has enabled it to function as a bridge between the East and 
West.  
 
THE EFFECTS OF GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
While political interaction with the European Union has yielded noteworthy 
change within Turkey, Kamil Yilmaz argues that great transformations have also 
resulted from closer economic integration with Europe. The beginnings of 
economic integration took root in the 1963 Ankara Agreement between Turkey 
and the European Community (EC). Instead of receiving full EC membership, 
Turkey was granted special economic privileges. The Customs Union (CU) of 
1996 between Turkey and the European Union improved the Turkish economic 
situation. As the final phase of the Ankara Agreement, the CU allows Turkey to 
further integrate economically with the EU “without undertaking serious political 
and institutional reforms, viewed as a precondition for full membership.”103 
Yilmaz notes that an important element of this economic integration is the notion 
of reciprocity of tariffs.104 In the first two phases of the Ankara Agreement, the 
EU eradicated tariffs on Turkish goods, and in the CU Turkey reciprocated by 
eliminating tariffs on EU goods as well as levying “the common external tariffs 
on the EU against third countries.”105  
                                                          
102
 Cohen, Saul B. "The Geopolitics of Turkey's Accession to the European Union." Eurasian 
Geography and Economics 45.8 (2004): 575-582. Print. 
103
 Yilmaz, Kamil. “The EU-Turkey Customs Union Fifteen Years Later: Better, Yet not the Best 
Alternative” South European Society and Politics 16.2 (2011): 235-249. Print. 
104
 Yilmaz, 236 
105
 Yilmaz, 236. 
35 
 
Additionally, the CU mandated that Turkey’s economic competition 
practices be brought in line with the EU’s. In effect, the CU “changed the Turkish 
trade policy framework completely by bringing in predictability, transparency, 
and stability”106 for the overall benefit of the Turkish economy. Following the CU 
and greater foreign penetration in Turkish markets, overall imports between 1995 
and 2000 soared from $35.7 billion to $54.5 billion.107 Over this same time 
period, imports from the EU also increased from $23.5 billion to $28.5 billion, 
highlighting the extent to which the EU dominated Turkey’s trade relations.108 
Nevertheless, the Turkish domestic market has remained strong, as Yilmaz notes 
“the transformations of Turkish industry following the CU helped it to prepare 
itself for even more formidable competitors such as China and other East Asian 
countries.”109 While some sectors, like textiles and chemical products, were 
initially negatively affected, the overall state of the Turkish economy has 
strengthened as a result of its integration with the European Union.110 
 Over the last decade, Turkey’s economy has been an exemplary success. 
The restructuring of Turkey’s economic institutions over the last two decades, 
demonstrated by a growth rate of 7.4% from 2002-2007 facilitated this 
achievement.111 However, Turkey was not immune to the global economic crisis 
of 2008-2009 and suffered a slight setback. In 2009, Turkey’s GDP decreased by 
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4.7% and unemployment rose from 8.8% to 12.5%.112 Nevertheless, the Turkish 
economy showed great resilience and by the second quarter of 2010 GDP 
increased by 10.3%.113 Presently, Turkey is a leading emerging market economy 
along with Brazil, India, South Africa, and South Korea.114 Turkey is the 15th 
largest economy in the world with a GDP of $1.1 trillion, a growth rate of 8.9%, 
foreign direct investment of $25 billion in 2011, with expectations that exports 
will reach $200 billion by 2013.115 Furthermore, Turkey is noteworthy for its 
tourism industry with revenues of $25 billion in 2011 and has one of the leading 
construction industries in the world.116 
 Additionally, Turkey is a member of the G20, a collection of twenty states 
comprised of the world’s biggest economies and other relevant regional 
powers.117 In addition to the global economy, the G20 deals with issues involving 
health, education, the environment, and conflict resolution.118 As a member of the 
G20, Turkey enjoys greater prestige and the opportunity to enhance its political 
and economic strength. These changes over the last three decades signify 
modifications in Turkey’s economic identity. As a free market economy with the 
benefits of G20 membership, Turkey is enabled to assert its position in the region 
as an important political and economic player.  
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Decades of economic interaction and more recent political relations with the 
European Union have been factors in enabling the emergence of Turkey as a 
regional power. The provisions of the Ankara Agreement, the Customs Union, 
and Copenhagen economic and political requirements have functioned to increase 
economic interdependency between Turkey and the European Union. According 
to Yilmaz, Turkey’s internal markets have been strengthened enough to deter 
competitive pressures from East Asia and assert its own agenda regionally and 
even internationally.119 Politically, Turkey has made wholesale changes via 
constitutional amendments and other institutional reforms to further democratize 
and extend civil and minority rights. This increased democratization, coerced by 
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Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and the 
Republic of Turkey, relations have been based not only on a military, political, 
and economic alliance but also shared interests and common identities as secular 
democracies. Through World War II and the Cold War, Turkey and the United 
States converged on security and policy interests resulting in increasingly 
tightened bilateral relations. Challenges to the relationship surfaced in the 1960s 
and 1970s but were overcome and made way for cooperation in the 1980s and 
1990s. In the post-Cold War era, with a less hostile international environment, the 
motive for a continued strategic partnership has been up for speculation. This 
notion has been precipitated by increasingly strained relations as Turkey looks to 
assert its influence outside of the umbrella of American hegemony. A shift in 
Turkey’s self-identity over the last decade has contributed to the tense relations. 
Some sources of tension include Turkey’s relations with Iran and Israel and the 
US War in Iraq. This chapter puts US-Turkish relations in historical context to 
elucidate contemporary developments and to assess the present relationship. 
 
RELATIONS THROUGH THE COLD WAR PERIOD 
Following World War II and the establishment of the bipolar international system 
that characterized the Cold War, the United States and Turkey had mutually 
beneficial interests in mitigating the power of the Soviet Union. Turkey realized 
39 
 
the threat posed by the burgeoning strength of its neighbor, especially after Stalin 
demanded border realignment and unlimited access to the Turkish Straits.120 The 
Cold War policy aimed at containing the Soviets led the United States to align 
with a geo-strategically important Turkey. Through the Truman Doctrine of 1947 
the United States provided military assistance to Greece and Turkey to support 
resistance to the Soviet threat. By the late 1950s, relations “blossomed into an 
extensive network of military, economic, and political relations that had the full 
support of policy makers in both Washington and Ankara.”121 During this period, 
the partnership was institutionalized with Turkey’s inclusion in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, a mutual defense agreement between the 
United States, Canada, and ten western European states.  
The first challenges to the US-Turkish alliance surfaced in the 1960s 
concerning the island of Cyprus. While a sovereign nation since 1960, Cyprus had 
a considerable Turkish minority in constant contention with the Greek majority. 
The controversy resulted from a letter from US President Lyndon Johnson in 
which he communicated that “NATO would not defend Turkey if the Soviet 
Union attacked it during a Turkish intervention to protect the Turkish Cypriot 
minority from the communal violence spearheaded by the Greek Cypriot 
majority.”122 The infamous Johnson letter was, and continues to be, a source of 
consternation in Turkey, contrasting the unwavering alliance that had previously 
characterized relations. The letter increased mistrust of the United States and even 
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anti-Americanism among some of the Turkish population.123 In 1974, Turkey 
invaded Cyprus to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. In response, the US 
Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, and Turkey reciprocated by 
suspending the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969 terminating the activities 
of all the American bases in the country with the exception of those that had a 
purely NATO function.124This series of events represented a nadir in US-Turkish 
relations. However, relations normalized with a lifting of the weapons embargo in 
1978. Ensuing positive relations would be due to concerns about the “security and 
regional stability implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the rise 
of a fundamentalist Islamic regime in Iran in 1979.”125 By the time of the Gulf 
War in the early 1990s, US-Turkish relations had returned to the status quo as 
Turkey was again identified as an important ally in enabling the coalition victory 
under US leadership. 
 
POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS 
From a realist perspective, the end of the Cold War produced a paradigm shift in 
the international political system from a contentious bipolar system to a unipolar 
system dominated by the United States. More recently, US hegemonic control is 
increasingly tempered by regional coalitions like the European Union and even by 
influential regional powers like South Korea, Brazil, South Africa, India and 
Turkey. This realist perspective is one alternative explanation for understanding 
post-Cold War developments. However, analyzing US-Turkish relations in this 
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new global context using the constructivist approach yields the question of 
whether each nation’s identities and interests converge enough to continue the 
partnership. From the constructivist perspective, there is an inherent concern with 
identity and how perceived self-identity affects interests and actions. Some recent 
actions and policies by Turkey have highlighted fundamental disagreements in 
policy considerations and perhaps an identity shift. In the post-Cold War period, 
Turkey has further asserted an independent foreign policy in pursuit of its own 
interests reflecting its hybrid identity, which has often not mirrored American 
policy. These actions support the argument that Turkey is an emerging regional 
power and is “no longer content to play the role of junior partner”126 in bilateral 
relations with the United States. This argument is evidenced by Turkey’s actions 
leading up to the US-led war in Iraq in 2003 and Turkey’s current relations with 
Iran and Israel. 
One of the most surprising and conspicuous clashes in policy perspectives 
came in the lead up to the war in Iraq in 2003. In planning for the invasion of Iraq, 
the United States expected to utilize Turkish territory to open a second front in the 
war. When asked for permission, the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted to 
disallow such an operation much to the surprise and chagrin of US 
policymakers.127 In Washington, this signaled disloyalty and distrust from Turkey, 
with residual effects. However, the decision of the Turkish Parliament must be 
understood in context. The ruling AKP party was unwilling to “back yet another 
US war against a Muslim country-especially when opinion polls indicated that 
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more than 90 percent of the Turkish population opposed an attack on Iraq.”128 
Allowing US troops to invade Iraq through Turkish territory would have set a 
dangerous precedent that was unconscionable for Turkish policymakers. This 
instance illustrated Turkey following a policy, which undermined US plans, but 
was necessary for the assertion of Turkey’s interests to sustain its hybrid identity 
as a modern Islamic democracy and a regional power. 
Another recent issue of contention between the United States and Turkey 
has been relations with Iran vis-à-vis its nuclear program. In its early years, the 
Obama Administration sought to engage Iran diplomatically to resolve the nuclear 
issue. However, diplomacy gave way to a more hardline position aimed at using 
economic sanctions against Iran. Both “unilaterally and through the United 
Nations,”129 the United States actively pursued sanctions as the most effective 
method for crippling the Iranian nuclear program. Conversely, Turkey was 
committed to diplomacy as the method for engaging its eastern neighbor. This 
perspective “resulted in Turkey voting ‘no’ at the UN Security Council”130 for 
increased sanctions in sharp opposition to US interests. The reason for this policy 
disagreement may be that Turkey does not perceive a nuclear Iran to be as big a 
threat as does the United States. Or, Turkey may have wanted to “avoid the rising 
tensions they feared would result from additional sanctions”131 against its 
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neighbor. The case of Iran exemplifies a definite divergence of opinion between 
the United States and Turkey.  
Furthermore, Turkey’s increasingly tense relations with Israel have 
strained US-Turkish relations, given the special relationship between the United 
States and Israel. While Turkey had previously been one of Israel’s few 
supporters in the region, developments in the last few years have soured the 
relationship. The ruling AKP party has been outspoken in its criticism of Israel, 
while giving greater support to the Palestinian cause. This was the case in 
“Ankara’s harsh criticism of the Israeli military offensive into Gaza in 2009.”132 
Additionally, the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010 was a source of 
heightened tensions between Israel and Turkey. The incident unfolded as “Israeli 
special forces attacked and boarded ships in a Turkish-led relief flotilla, 
supposedly on a humanitarian mission to Gaza” which resulted in the killing of 
several Turkish citizens.133 In addition to attracting international media attention, 
this incident resulted in increasingly strained diplomatic relations between Turkey 
and Israel. To some extent, the worsening Israeli-Turkish relationship can be 
attributed to Turkey’s evolving identity as it embraces its Islamic identity. As a 
result, Turkey feels greater solidarity with its Muslim brethren in Palestine, with 
adverse effects for its relations with Israel. 
Nevertheless, regarding Israel, both Turkey and the United States agree on 
“a Jewish state with defined and recognized borders that can live side-by-side 
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with a self-sustainable, viable, and demilitarized Palestinian state.”134 This 
harmony in objectives is true of most policy considerations between the United 
States and Turkey. While there are some major policy disagreements, as already 
mentioned, minor differences should not undermine common goals.135 President 
Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan both emphasize the continued strategic 
partnership that exists between the United States and Turkey, underscoring the 
continuity in relations between the two states.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Since World War II, the United States and Turkey have maintained strong 
political, economic, and military relations, with only brief periods of contention. 
Throughout the Cold War era, this relationship benefited both states in their 
efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Also, Turkey benefited by growing its 
economy, military power, and political influence. As a result, in the post-Cold 
War period, Turkey was enabled to assert itself as a regional power. This 
assertion of power involved undertaking independent foreign policy that 
sometimes countered the interests of the United States. Turkey’s evolving self-
identification greatly contributed to these clashes in policy. As Turkey embraced 
its enhanced economic and political influence and its Muslim identity, it acquired 
a unique position as a Western ally with commitments and responsibilities in the 
Muslim world.  While this has led to continued disagreement on certain issues, 
Turkey and the United States share common values, a commitment to secular 
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republican democracy, and common political, military and economic interests that 


















































The changing political dynamics of Eurasia necessitate a reexamination of the 
strategic partnership between Turkey and the United States. Recent developments 
have bolstered the influence of some states, strained US relations with former 
partners, and diminished American authority in the region. This reduced 
American role underscores the importance of strengthening relations with Turkey, 
an emergent regional power, whose partnership is invaluable to advancing US 
interests in the region. For the United States, Turkey is a precious resource for 
issues concerning securing access to energy, military and security concerns, 
encouragement of democratization in the Arab world, and support for the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. All of these issues are vital to US regional interests and both 
countries could mutually benefit from strengthened ties. 
 
THE CHANGING US ROLE IN THE REGION 
According to Hillel Fradkin and Lewis Libby, the Middle East has undergone 
conspicuous changes in its balance of power over the last decade.136 There has 
been an emergence of regional power-brokers, like Turkey and Iran, but also the 
destabilization of formerly influential nations, like Iraq. These changing dynamics 
are most pronounced with the developments of the Arab Spring and the ousting of 
decades-old regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. These changes have 
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implications for US relations with states in the region and for the amplification of 
American power. Fradkin and Libby argue that American influence in the region 
has weakened as “our ties have eroded with states that once supported much of 
our agenda,”137 undermining American objectives and interests. As a nation that 
previously exerted extensive influence in regional activities, the United States is 
increasingly less able to “support friends, punish enemies, or achieve [its] 
aims.”138  
 Islamic theologian Ibn Hazm famously stated that “if you treat your friend 
and enemy the same, you will arouse distaste for your friendships and contempt 
for your enemies, and you will not be long for this world.”139 Elements of US 
foreign policy in the Middle East have demonstrated this very point. The 
hypocrisy and lack of assertiveness that have characterized recent policies have 
functioned to precipitate the diminishing of US influence in the region. In the 
wake of the Arab Spring, US willingness to utilize military force in Libya to assist 
domestic insurrection but ignore similar developments in Syria and Bahrain, 
highlights an inconsistency in US policy that has served to undermine American 
legitimacy.  
 The waning of American power underscores the value of strengthening the 
partnership with Turkey, a resurgent regional player. The “prevailing security-
heavy framework”140 that has historically characterized relations must be 
realigned in light of changing dynamics. Recently, American interests in the 
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region have centered on routing al-Qaeda and other agents of global terror, 
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thwarting nuclear proliferation and 
insuring access to energy.141 Turkey is “proximate to countries pivotal to 
American foreign policy and national security”142 and has the political and 
economic wherewithal to assist US objectives positively. Therefore, the 
delineations of the partnership must reflect these changing realities. In effect, the 
United States can neither belittle nor unilaterally force Turkey’s hand. The 
rapprochement begun under the Obama administration must continue to fortify 
relations in pursuit of mutually beneficial interests. Turkey and the United States 
share an identity as secular democracies which should reinforce relations and 
enable future cooperation.   
 
US INTERESTS IN EURASIA AND THE ROLE OF TURKEY 
I argue that to achieve its objectives in the region, the United States must better 
utilize its strategic partnership with Turkey. On issues such as securing access to 
energy resources, military and security concerns, encouraging democratization in 
the Arab world, and supporting the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
Turkey can serve as a beneficial regional partner. In terms of access to energy, 
Turkey is located on “critical waterways and narrows (the Caspian Sea, the Black 
Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Bosporus and Dardanelles), channels for trade 
and the flow of energy to global markets.”143 Additionally, the enormously 
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important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has its terminus at the Turkish 
Mediterranean city of Ceyhan. Petroleum from this pipeline supplies energy to 
several Central Asian nations and is “essential to American efforts to reduce the 
dependence of Azerbaijan, and potentially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, on 
Russia’s energy pipelines.”144 In essence, Turkey’s geographical location makes it 
a vital part of enabling the supply of energy to the global market. And, the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline functions to moderate the potential regional influence that 
could be wielded by Russia because of its vast energy supplies, for the benefit of 
broader US regional interests.  
 Further, Menon and Wimbush argue that decades of military cooperation 
have helped to solidify Turkey’s position as an essential NATO member with far-
reaching benefits for American military missions in the region. As a member of 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Turkey has been involved in 
the stabilization and development of Afghanistan.145 Military bases throughout 
Turkey- in Incirlik, Batman, Diyarbakir, Malatya, and Mus- support NATO as 
well as US missions in the region.146 In the war against Iraq, the United States 
was able to use Turkish airspace for its aircrafts and Turkey provided vital 
“logistical support to US forces in Iraq.”147 Reciprocally, the United States aids 
Turkey in its struggle against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) insurgency. 
US economic and military assistance supports Turkey in its fight against the 
northern Iraq based militants. The United States categorizes “the PKK as a 
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terrorist organization and continually emphasizes its commitment to defeating all 
terrorists in Iraq.”148 These long-standing military ties, while part of a variety of 
strategic interests, are mutually beneficial and should be persistently cultivated. 
 Furthermore, Turkey, in its role as a mediator, can serve as a partner in the 
proliferation of peace and democracy in the region, most notably with the 
developments of the Arab Spring and the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. The recent wave of democratization sweeping the Arab world has 
enabled the emergence of free speech and human rights in previously 
authoritarian nations. With the American emphasis on personal freedom and 
democratic institutions, the events of the Arab Spring signal progressive change 
for the Middle East. However, the process of democratizing, as evidenced by 
Turkey, can be difficult and protracted. While the United States cannot 
unilaterally impose democratic institutions on Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, it can 
utilize Turkey’s status as a regional power and an Islamic democracy. Already, 
Turkey has taken an active role in working with the Arab League to resolve the 
crisis in Syria and can extend that role to assisting the democratizing Arab Spring 
nations.  
While Turkey should not necessarily be shown as a model Muslim 
democracy, the democratizing process in Turkey can be instructive for nascent 
regimes across the Arab world. Additionally, Turkey can serve a significant role 
in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, an issue of grave importance to the 
United States. The special relationship between the United States and Israel is the 
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source of wide-spread consternation and anti-Americanism across the region. 
However, as a Muslim nation with former close ties to Israel and growing 
sympathy for the Palestinian cause, Turkey can and is willing to exert its regional 
power and play the role of peacemaker. In fact, Turkey has “offered its good 
offices to begin a dialogue between Hamas and Israel”149, a potentially substantial 
development given the current impasse. As Joshua Walker asserts, the importance 
of Turkey for US regional interests cannot be overstated.150 Turkey is an essential 
component in the US pursuit of military collaboration, access to energy, and 
furthering peace and democracy in the region. Therefore, “a reinvigorated 
strategic partnership is possible, and will be in the interest of both countries. But it 
is likely to have quite different contours, with new forms of engagement-and 
more realistic expectations.”151 
 President Obama highlighted the strategic importance of Turkey in a 
speech to the Turkish Parliament in 2009. While identifying Turkey as a “critical 
ally,” President Obama recognized the recent strained relations by emphasizing 
the need to “build on our mutual interests and rise above our differences.”152 
Going forward, the President proposed that the partnership be centered around 
recognition of a long historical alliance, the importance of Turkey in the ”East-
West corridor for oil and natural gas,” and a united fight in the war against 
terror.153 In this speech, and through the course of the administration, President 
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Obama has shown a willingness to further engage with Turkey to ameliorate 
relations by emphasizing points of convergence. Efforts to support “renewable 
energy investment in Turkey” or intensified attacks on al Qaeda and the PKK 
should characterize bilateral relations.154 The Obama administration recognizes 
Turkey’s emergent role in the region and acknowledges that there will sometimes 
be divergence in national interests due to conflicting identities. Increasingly, 
Turkey hybrid identity as a Western ally and a leading Muslim nation is becoming 
more apparent and problematic. The United States must respect Turkey’s hybrid 
identity and be cognizant of conflicting interests. Therefore, the strengthening of 
bilateral relations will be facilitated by pursuing objectives that are mutually 




For decades, the United States has had strategic interests in Eurasia. These 
interests are as important as ever, highlighting the importance of maintaining and 
strengthening relations with the US’s regional partner, Turkey. Over time, 
developments in the region have reduced American power while inversely 
affirming Turkey’s position as a regional power. Also, the United States has 
significant regional interests concerning access to energy resources, military and 
security concerns, supporting the emerging democracies of the Arab Spring, and 
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given Turkey’s important position in the 
region and its ability to assist in all of these areas, the United States must 
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CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to make two general arguments. First, I argue 
that Turkey has emerged as a regional power, which has been enabled by 
numerous factors that have reinforced one another. Second, that Turkey’s 
emergence as a regional power has implications for US-Turkish bilateral relations 
and for American interests in Eurasia. In proving the first argument, the paper 
analysis Turkey’s foundational history and shows how the nation-building project 
under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk enabled the establishment of unique foundational 
principles that eventually allowed Turkey’s emergence. Then, the paper examines 
the process of democratization in Turkey. Through decades of democratizing, 
Turkey has developed a viable Muslim democracy, albeit imperfect, that has 
legitimized Turkey politically and presented it as a regional player. Additionally, 
the paper evaluates certain economic and political policies undertaken by Turkey 
in the last three decades. By instituting a neo-liberal economic model, Turkey 
attracted foreign investment and integrated into the regional market. Also, through 
a more aggressive foreign policy and rapprochement with neighboring nations, 
Turkey has established itself as an economic and political regional power. 
Furthermore, the paper examines the process of Europeanization in Turkey. In 
essence, through economic integration with Europe and the reforms induced by 
the EU accession process, Turkey has further legitimized its regional role.  
 In proving the second argument, the paper begins with a brief overview of 
the history of US-Turkish bilateral relations and shows that it has been 
characterized by a military, political and economic alliance and shared identities 
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as secular democracies. However, the paper reveals major points of contention 
between American and Turkish policy, namely the US-led war in Iraq and 
Turkish relations with Iran and Syria. Because Turkey pursued policy objectives 
that countered the US position, there was a resultant strain on relations which 
served to undermine the partnership. There is an analysis of the changing regional 
political dynamics and its implications for US objectives. Given US interests in 
the region and a common identity with Turkey as secular democracies, the paper 
argues for strengthened bilateral relations for the benefit of mutual interests.   
 In making these arguments, the paper also serves to elucidate certain 
global developments. For one, Turkey is emblematic of a changing global 
political system in which certain nations are accruing larger regional significance. 
Apart from Turkey, this trend is evident in South Korea, Brazil, India, among 
others. Additionally, these emergent regional powers are mitigating the influence 
of larger nations like the United States, which has unavoidable implications for 
the formation and implementation of American foreign policy. In essence, US 
foreign policy can no longer be unilateral in nature, but must further harmonize 
with regional partners for the realization of American objectives.  
 To some extent, the notion of Turkey as an emergent regional power is a 
self-conceived identity. Through the international relations theory of 
constructivism which argues that “how actors define their ‘selves’ . . . informs 
their ‘interests’”155 and actions, Turkey is identifying itself as an important 
regional player and promulgating that image. However, I assert that the enhanced 
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economic and political importance of Turkey justifies this self-conceived identity 
and that Turkey is an emergent power. Even among the Turkish polity, there is a 
general acceptance of the nation’s regional role evidenced by a poll showing that 
62% of Turks have confidence in Prime Minister Erdogan’s foreign policy.156 
Similarly, polls show that throughout the region there is approval of Turkey’s 
burgeoning role with 78% of Egyptians and 72% of Jordanians supporting 
Erdogan’s policies.  Furthermore, I assert that there is growing recognition 
outside of the region, specifically from the United States, of Turkey’s importance. 
Essentially, US policymakers are increasing cognizant of Turkey’s significance 
for American objectives in Eurasia and I argue for strengthened bilateral relation 
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Summary of Capstone Project 
The purpose of this project is to show the increasing political and economic 
importance of Turkey in Eurasia. The paper argues that Turkey has emerged as a 
regional power in Eurasia and that this emergence has implications for US-
Turkish relations. In effect, the United States and Turkey share a common identity 
as secular republican democracies and common political, military and economic 
interests and must strengthen their partnership for mutually beneficial interests in 
the region.  
 The first part of the paper analyzes the notion of Turkey as a regional 
power. By using the term regional power, the implication is that Turkey has 
acquired political and economic influence in the region that has enhanced its 
importance. While Turkey cannot drastically impact global developments, the 
paper emphasizes the importance of Turkey in Eurasia. The purpose of this part is 
to explain what accounts for Turkey’s emergence as a regional power, essentially 
what steps led to Turkey’s current position as a politically and economically 
important state. The paper proposes that four factors led to Turkey’s emergence as 
a regional power: the principles that founded the nation, the role of democracy in 
Turkey’s development, economic and political policies over the last three 
decades, and Turkey’s interaction with the European Union. All of these factors 
are presented as working collectively to enable Turkey’s eventual emergence as a 
regional power.  
 The second part of the paper makes a connection between Turkey’s 
emergence as a regional power and its implications for relations between Turkey 
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and the United States. There is an overview of the history of US-Turkish relations 
to show the depth of friendship based on a common democratic identity and a 
military, political, and economic alliance. Also, the paper shows that the United 
States has certain strategic interests in the region, namely, securing access to 
energy, maintaining a military presence and containing security threats, 
supporting democracy in the Arab world and advocating for a peaceful resolution 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over the last decade, however, there have been 
tense relations between the United States and Turkey because of disagreements on 
certain issues. Overall, the paper argues that given US interests in the region and a 
common identity with Turkey as secular democracies, the United States and 
Turkey must strengthen bilateral relations for the benefit of mutual interests.  
 Throughout the paper, the international relations theory of constructivism 
is used to show the evolving identity, interests, and actions of Turkey. 
Constructivism argues that the interests and policies of a state are reliant upon the 
state’s self-identity. For example, because Turkey identifies as a part of the West 
it has attempted to institute a form of democracy acceptable to western states. 
Also, because Turkey self identifies as a leader in the Islamic world it has sought 
better relations with all of its neighboring Muslim nations. Throughout the paper, 
constructivism is used as a lens for understanding the perceptions and actions of 
Turkey and the United States.  
 The method for conducting this research involved consultation of journal 
articles, news media sources, books, interviews, speeches, and relevant blogs. 
Also, the author was privileged to spend time conducting empirical research in 
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Turkey. First, the author interned for an organization that advocates strengthened 
relations between the United States and Turkey. Second, by taking university 
courses in Istanbul the author was able to gain an understanding of the Turkish 
perspective. Additionally, consultation with faculty, both in Istanbul and 
Syracuse, enabled the author to engage with the literature at great length. As a 
result, the paper serves to inform the reader about Turkey’s importance and also 
function as advocacy for modified US foreign policy towards Turkey.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
